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Abstract
We posit that household decision-making over fertility is characterized by moral hazard
due to the fact that most contraception can only be perfectly observed by the woman. Using
an experiment in Zambia that varied whether women were given access to contraceptives
alone or with their husbands, we ﬁnd that women given access with their husbands were 19%
less likely to seek family planning services, 25% less likely to use concealable contraception,
and 27% more likely to give birth. However, women given access to contraception alone
report a lower subjective well-being, suggesting a psychosocial cost of making contraceptives
more concealable.
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11 Introduction
The ability to control fertility through modern contraception is one of the most important techno-
logical developments of the 20th century, with potentially broad social and economic consequences
for women and society. Yet despite the fact that modern methods of birth control have been
around for almost half a century, many countries still report substantial unmet need for con-
traceptives and high rates of unwanted births.1 For instance, the overall rate of unmet need in
Sub-Saharan Africa was estimated to be 27% in 2006 (Westoﬀ, 2006). Although unwanted births
are often treated as evidence of a supply constraint, the fact that high rates of unwanted births
occur in settings in which birth control is readily and cheaply available suggests that household
demand for children must be a critical factor underlying low levels of contraceptive adoption
(Pritchett, 1994).
In truth, the term “unwanted” is potentially misleading, given that household demand for
fertility depends on two partners who may disagree about the optimal number of children. Indeed,
data from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) indicate that, in many countries, men
on average report larger ideal family sizes than their wives (Westoﬀ, 2010). While diﬀerences in
preferences between spouses have been documented across many domains, leading to a rejection
of unitary models of the household (Thomas, 1990; Lundberg et al., 1997; Lusardi, 2009), under
standard bargaining models couples can still achieve eﬃcient outcomes (Rangel, 2006; Manser
and Brown, 1980; Browning and Chiappori, 1998). However, these models, with a few exceptions,
are generally silent on the implications of asymmetric information and hidden action, which can
lead to ineﬃciency (Bloch and Rao, 2002; Anderson and Genicot, 2012; Ashraf, 2009).
The possibility of hidden action is signiﬁcant in the fertility domain, where many modern
contraceptive technologies are used by the wife and unobservable to the husband. Qualitative
studies and survey data from Zambia and elsewhere indicate that women frequently hide contra-
ceptive use from their partners (Biddlecom and Fapohunda, 1998; Castle et al., 1999; McCarraher
et al., 2005), and concealability is the most cited reason given for the growth in popularity of
injectable contraceptives (Kaler, 2000; Gule, 1994).
1 Unmet need is deﬁned by demographers as the diﬀerence between the share of women at risk of pregnancy
who report wishing to space or discontinue childbearing and the share of women who report currently using a
contraceptive method. Unwanted births are deﬁned either, using panel data, as births to women who reported
within the past two years that they did not wish to become pregnant within the next two years, or, using
cross-section data, as births to women who report ex-post that the birth was undesired.
2This paper documents the role of moral hazard in household decision-making over fertility,
and presents evidence of ineﬃciencies in household bargaining around fertility through a ﬁeld
experiment with a large family planning clinic in Lusaka, Zambia. Our experiment provided 749
married women with a voucher guaranteeing free and immediate access to modern contraceptives
through a private appointment with a family planning nurse. This included access to the most
concealable and highly demanded method, which is often out of stock – injectables. In one
condition, the voucher was provided to women alone (“Individual”) and required her signature
only; in the other condition it was handed to the husband in the presence of his wife and required
both of their signatures (“Couple”). The Individual treatment approximates the many family
planning programs that target women directly and privately, providing them the opportunity for
greater reproductive control (OlaOlorun and Tsu, 2010). The Couple treatment, by essentially
giving husbands veto power over contraceptives provided throughout the study, approximates
the spousal consent rules governing many family planning services oﬀered through public and
private clinics in much of the developing world (Miller et al., 1998).
We use this experiment to investigate the impact on contraceptive use and fertility of spousal
consent which reduces the scope for moral hazard – thereby limiting women’s ability to meet their
own fertility objectives, but also potentially curtailing suspicion and mistrust in the household.
We ﬁrst present a conceptual framework, drawing from a benchmark collective model, to derive
predictions for both the long run and the experiment. We subsequently introduce a psychosocial
cost to the household of moral hazard in intimate settings, a shading by the husband that arises
from aggrievement (Hart and Moore, 2008), and show how the incorporation of this psychosocial
cost has distinct long-run implications, which can arise even in the absence of assumptions of
commitment and eﬃciency.
The resulting predictions are supported by the empirical ﬁndings from our experiment, which
provide evidence of a trade-oﬀ between privately improving the woman’s set of choices, which may
result in contraceptive outcomes that could improve welfare for herself and her child, and lowering
the conjugal value of the marriage. In our experiment, women assigned to a treatment group
in which their husbands were better able to control wives’ use of family planning services were
10 percentage points (19%) less likely to visit a family planning nurse and 6 percentage points
(25%) less likely to use a relatively concealable form of contraception (injectables). The local
average treatment eﬀect from instrumental variables (IV) estimation indicates that use of family
3planning services during this period was associated with a 27% reduction in births. These eﬀects
were concentrated, as predicted by theory, among women who wanted to postpone childbearing
and also reported having a husband who desired more additional children than they did. Among
this subsample, involving husbands in the family planning visit reduced use of injectables by
40%. There was no measurable treatment eﬀect on the remainder of women. We ﬁnd evidence
suggestive of possible dynamic ineﬃciency in household bargaining over family planning, even
when both spouses wish to postpone childbearing by at least two years. Such features of the
bargaining environment could increase the net welfare beneﬁt of placing contraceptives in the
hands of women.
Two years after the intervention, we do not ﬁnd any increase in marital dissolution or do-
mestic violence among responders in the Individual treatment. However, we do ﬁnd that these
individuals experienced a signiﬁcant reduction in happiness, health and ease of mind compared
to those in the Couple treatment. This suggests a longer-term psychosocial cost to concealable
contraceptives that can be mitigated by spousal involvement and is often ignored by programs
focused on giving women reproductive control. We also ﬁnd that giving men more control over
contraceptives may lessen the marital tension and strife that the moral hazard problem inherent
in contraception creates.
Ultimately, then, our results on welfare are inconclusive. Our results provide a cautionary
note both to family planning programs that target women exclusively and promote more con-
cealable forms of contraceptives, and to male involvement campaigns hoping to change fertility
trends and promote family planning. The conclusion discusses other ﬁrst-best options in light of
these trade-oﬀs.
2 Context
Our study is set in urban Zambia, where fertility and undesired pregnancy are high. According
to the 2007 Zambia Demographic Health Survey (ZDHS), 41% of births in the previous ﬁve years
were unwanted at the time of conception.2 However, it is likely that many were unwanted only
by the wife. Based on data from a nationally representative 2002 survey of men’s family planning
attitudes, on average Zambian men want 0.8 more children than their wives (Salem, 2004).
2 According to the 2007 ZDHS, the total fertility rate in Lusaka was 4.6 and maternal mortality was estimated to
be 1 in 27 nationwide.
4As in many countries in which men have relatively high demand for children, there is sig-
niﬁcant anecdotal evidence that women hide contraceptive use. Female demand is consequently
higher for less visible methods such as injectables, which are superior to the pill in terms of
both eﬃcacy and concealability.3 In a study in Swaziland, for example, injectables and IUDs
were reported to be the most popular methods because they do not have to be taken every day
and are easy to hide (Gule, 1994). Correspondingly, data from our baseline survey in Zambia
indicate that a high fraction of women hide contraceptive use from their husbands. Among the
23% of men who claim they are currently “not doing anything to prevent pregnancy,” 59% have
wives who separately report using some method of birth control. Furthermore, 77% of women
reported preferring “a family planning method that only I know I am using.” Likewise, demand
for injectables is high: at baseline, 20% of women were relying on injectables, and 37% said they
hoped to use them in the future.
In Lusaka, contraceptives – including pills, condoms and injectables – can be obtained through
public clinics, private clinics, or pharmacies; however, the price of access ﬂuctuates widely. In-
jectables have been available in Zambia for many years, but are often either stocked out or pulled
out of the market (USAID, 2005).4 According to a comprehensive assessment of stockouts con-
ducted by USAID, between October and December 2007, 53% of hospitals and health clinics in
Zambia were stocked out of injectables for an average of 54 out of 90 days, and 28% were stocked
out of contraceptive pills for an average of 35 out of 90 days (Ali et al., 2008). During the time
of our study, there were frequent stockouts and very long waiting times at clinics, leading to
high variance in supply. According to personnel at the clinic in which we conducted our study,
3 Women report hiding their contraceptives through various creative strategies: obtaining them from clinics close
to the market while they do their shopping, or hiding them in bags of maize meal, outside under a stone, in their
daughter’s rooms, in the roofs or with a female friend. In a survey of studies across Africa, documented covert
use has ranged from 6 percent to 20 percent (Biddlecom and Fapohunda, 1998). According to Kaler (2000),
“The desire for women to gain control over the means of regulating their fertility and the need for this seizure
of control to be invisible to the eyes of the husband... led to the dominance of the Depo-Provera injection, the
most private of all available methods.” Zulu (1998) explains one woman’s predicament in Malawi: “She said she
could not go for sterilization since the hospital requires the husband’s approval. She ruled out pills because it
woud be easy for the husband to catch her since pills are taken every day. She thought the injection was the
best option for her since it is administered once in three months, and she could lie to her husband that she went
to the hospital for a vaccine.”
4 Until the mid-1990s, most women in Zambia who used modern family planning methods used either oral contra-
ceptives or the condom. Interventions sought to expand contraceptive choice, in particular working to overcome
long-standing biases against injectables, which had essentially been banned in the country since 1982. This led
to increased take-up of all methods, and injectables (registered in 2004) were found to be particularly popular
(Depo-Provera, 2011).
5the year before our study injectables were out of stock more than half of the time.5 Although
patients could purchase injectables outside of the clinic and bring them in to be administered,
nurses reported that average wait times for family planning visits were typically more than 2
hours, and often approached 3-4 hours.
Though spousal consent was required by law until 2005, women are no longer oﬃcially re-
quired to have their husbands’ approval in order to obtain contraceptives through public clinics
in Zambia. Anecdotally, however, health care providers in rural Zambia, as in other parts of
rural Africa, still commonly refuse to give contraceptives to women without the explicit consent
of their husbands. For long-term methods such as implants and IUDs, this practice has been
reported in urban areas as well (Osei-Hwedie and Osei-Hwedie, 1992). Similar practices have
been documented in other African countries (Miller et al., 1998).
Perhaps because of spousal consent practices, men are generally aware of the existence of
injectables. In the 2007 ZDHS, 75.1% of men knew about injectables despite the fact that only
18.8% of women had ever used them (Central Statistical Oﬃce, 2009). However, since husbands
rarely visit the clinic, women likely have more precise information regarding current availability.
There is anecdotal evidence that suspicion over hidden contraception has contributed to
increased marital tension in some households (Kaler, 2000). According to Chikovore et al. (2002),
couples engage in a process of “hide-and-seek,” where “women acquire and use contraceptives
secretly while men search for evidence of use.” In in-depth interviews we conducted with women
drawn from the same population as our study sample, women stressed the challenge of husbands
generally being suspicious. As one woman described, “women are ever worried, especially those
on pills because it’s not easy to hide pills in these small houses of ours. For the injectables, they
are less worried because a man cannot easily tell unless ... you are not conceiving.”
3 Conceptual Framework
We provide a basic conceptual framework with which to analyze what occurs when women’s
decision rights over contraception are curtailed by spousal consent rules (which shut down moral
hazard), both in our experiment and in the long run. This distinction is important because, when
women were given more autonomy over contraceptive choice in the context of our experiment,
5 Interview, Nurse Grace Daka, Chipata Clinic, July 2009.
6husbands’ beliefs about their wives’ ability to access contraception were also potentially altered.6
We think of the long run as the point at which the supply of injectables has become suﬃciently
widespread and consistently available that the scope for moral hazard is transparent to all parties.
Although testing for long-run predictions is outside of the scope of this paper, it is useful to have
a framework for thinking about them in order to interpret our results.
We begin by deriving predictions based on a collective bargaining model (Browning and Chi-
appori, 1998; Chiappori et al., 2002), with the fundamental assumption that spouses can bargain
eﬃciently. To provide a benchmark, we assume that utility is transferable within the household,
and remain agnostic as to which bargaining solution is used.7 We also assume a ﬁxed distri-
bution of bargaining weights, and predict how moral hazard aﬀects outcomes given this ﬁxed
distribution.8 We make predictions for both the experiment and the long run, using this bench-
mark model. We then introduce a particular cost to the household of moral hazard in intimate
settings, a shading by the husband that arises from aggrievement (Hart and Moore, 2008), and
show how the incorporation of this psychosocial cost has diﬀerent long-run implications. In the
Online Technical Appendix, we show mathematically how this can arise even in the absence of
commitment and transferable utility via a noncooperative bargaining model with moral hazard
where eﬃcient bargaining is not assumed.
3.1 Bargaining Eﬃciently
Although traditionally collective bargaining frameworks have ruled out informational frictions
of the kind generated by moral hazard, we can use as a benchmark case what we might expect
if spouses were able to redistribute surplus amongst themselves eﬃciently in the face of a moral
hazard constraint. Consider the choice of whether the wife should use contraception. We are
interested in the case in which the wife does not want another child and the husband does.
6 In particular, husbands in the Individual condition knew about the existence of injectables but did not necessarily
know that their wife had free and guaranteed access to them, whereas in the Couple condition the husband and
wife had the same beliefs about access. Importantly, our setting is one in which both men and women knew of
the existence of injectables prior to our study but the supply was very limited and erratic.
7 See for instance Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981) for models of cooperative bargaining
in which explicit bargaining concepts are analysed.
8 One eﬀect of increasing moral hazard may be to increase the bargaining weight of the wife, although this is not
certain. This could lead to a type of dynamic ineﬃciency, where even if there is agreement on the wife’s most
preferred option in the ﬁrst period (here, not having a child), the husband wants to avoid any contraception that
introduces moral hazard as it could aﬀect her bargaining power in the second period, and thus the couple may
reach an ineﬃcient outcome. We ﬁnd evidence consistent with this outcome, described in the Results section.
7Case 1: Contraception is Pareto-eﬃcient Consider ﬁrst couples for which the Pareto-
eﬃcient choice absent moral hazard involves using contraception. This happens whenever the
wife’s net increase in payoﬀ from not having a child (including the various costs of acquiring
and using contraception) is greater than the husband’s net decrease in payoﬀ. The collective
paradigm assumes that the couple coordinates on using contraception and the husband receives
some form of compensation. Since the couple, absent moral hazard, coordinates on the wife’s
most preferred choice (that is, since there is no tension between the wife’s preferences and what
the “marital contract” is designed to have her do), there is no reason to anticipate that, when
this decision is not observable, the couple would coordinate on inducing the wife to not use
contraception. As there is nothing to prevent the couples in question from taking the eﬃcient
action, they will use contraception whether it is observable or not. Importantly, thus, we expect
no diﬀerences across the Individual and Couple groups in injectables use for these couples.9
Case 2: No use of contraception is Pareto-eﬃcient Consider now the couples for which
the Pareto-eﬃcient choice absent moral hazard is not to use contraception; that is, the wife’s net
increase in payoﬀ from not having a child is lower than the husband’s net decrease in payoﬀ. While
the exact outcome of introducing moral hazard depends on the employed bargaining solution and
the spouses’ preferences towards risk, we may nevertheless reach several conjectures.10
Note ﬁrst that the non-observability of contraception use tends to make intra-household bar-
gaining less eﬃcient (simply by reducing the number of contractible contingencies) since these
couples are coordinating on the wife taking her least preferred option. Given these ineﬃciencies,
it follows that the larger the scope for moral hazard in the long run, the (weakly) lower the
surplus created by the couple. Because of this, more of these couples should either start using
contraception or revert to their outside options such as the payoﬀs under divorce or the payoﬀs
accruing in a noncooperative outcome (Lundberg and Pollak, 1993). Said diﬀerently, contracep-
tion take-up should increase in the long run together with moral hazard, if moral hazard is not
so severe that couples start separating.11
9 In the Individual treatment, showing her husband the voucher may lead to a renegotiation in favor of the husband
and thus she may prefer to remain silent, use the contraception and make the transfer as agreed upon in the
status quo. In the Couple treatment, she may need to provide him more transfers. Her payoﬀs then would be
higher in the Individual condition.
10We describe below one reduced-form way of introducing moral hazard, with risk neutrality.
11In our case, we do not ﬁnd evidence of treatment eﬀects on separation or violence.
83.2 Costs of moral hazard
One speciﬁc way to incorporate moral hazard into a collective model that, although reduced
form, yields insight, is through a psychosocial cost that reduces the surplus of the couple. We
allow the husband to feel aggrieved and act as a “diﬃcult” husband, depending on his level of
suspicion concerning the wife’s use of contraception. Although injectables are virtually unde-
tectable, his suspicion should increase as time goes by without his wife conceiving. The language
of aggrievement is taken from Hart and Moore (2008), where becoming a “diﬃcult” husband in
our setting is what Hart and Moore model as ex-post uncontractible shading. In our setting,
the informal contract makes clear the expectation of childbearing as part of the marital arrange-
ment, a strong cultural norm. The husband can become “aggrieved” when these expectations
for children are not met (or not met quickly enough) when there is a possibility for shirking by
the wife. Shading thus arises here from the suspicion that the reason for not having a child is
shirking, and not bad luck.12
The perception that a partner could be keeping something private can create a feeling of
distrust and social exclusion, which then translates to worse emotional outcomes for the partner
perceived as concealing (for a review see Williams, 2007). This is supported by qualitative
work we conducted with study subjects several years after the experiment in which we asked a
representative sample of 30 men how they would interpret a voucher for family planning services
being handed to them, showing them a replica of the voucher used in the experiment. They
talked of a feeling of being “not excluded from something that belongs to me too” and having
“control over her visit to the clinic because if I don’t get involved she might get birth control for
5 years while I still want to have children.” The inclusion of men gives them more control – and
hence ability to obstruct women’s choices – but at the same time the psychological beneﬁt to
the husband can have positive spillovers on the wife. If the couple had coordinated on not using
contraception and having another child, the presence of this eﬀect of moral hazard would lead
12Shading here is thus based on the subjective probability of an unobservable action (that is, contraception),
while it comes from an observable price in Hart and Moore (2008). If the husband and wife can transfer utility
contingent on the birth of a child, they can write a contract that implements no use of contraception even in
the absence of shading. Thus, if the husband’s shading decision is based on his rational belief, he will not shade
under such a contract and shading will be irrelevant in equilibrium. There are two potential reasons why this
might not be the case: 1) The couple cannot write a child-contingent contract, as in the noncooperative model
below, or 2) the husband has an “automatic”/hard-wired response of feeling aggrieved to expectations not being
met. This hard-wired response is predictable and based, as we describe below, on his subjective probability that
the reason for expectations not being met is contraceptive use (and not bad luck, for example).
9the husband to become increasingly aggrieved as his wife does not conceive, suspecting that she
is using contraception and shirking their contract – and thus impose a loss on the wife.
Of course, the husband has to feel conﬁdent enough that the wife’s shirking/taking contra-
ception is the reason for a delay in conception. That will be the case only when the scope for
moral hazard is high enough (say because the supply of contraceptives is known to be high). She
might use contraception as long as he does not (suﬃciently) suspect. Thus we would observe
couples who would not have used contraception absent moral hazard, but who use contracep-
tion once the scope for moral hazard increases. However, if suspicion and aggrievement is high
enough – for example, if the supply of injectables becomes guaranteed and widespread while
men’s expectations of the marital contract (reference point) remain constant – contraceptive use
could easily revert back to baseline levels in the long run.
3.3 Aggrievement in a non-cooperative model
Interestingly, the model of aggrievement, and its results, do not require assumptions of commit-
ment, transferable utility, or even eﬃciency. In the Online Technical Appendix, we analyze a
model of how aggrievement arises in a non-cooperative game, in which husband and wife can-
not reach binding agreements (i.e., each spouse’s action is a best response to the other spouse’s
action). Aggrievement is in this case precisely ex-post noncontractible shading. The predictions
for the experiment itself are similar to those of the cooperative model above. In the long run we
assume, as above, that the husband has the right beliefs concerning the scope for moral hazard.13
We ﬁnd a possibility that, among couples with misaligned preferences for fertility, increased sup-
ply of concealable contraceptives past a certain threshold could generate a mistrust that leads
to welfare losses for both husband and wife, akin to Akerlof (1970). This ultimately could lead
to less use of injectables overall and lower subjective well-being for both parties in the long run.
3.4 Mapping predictions to the experimental setting
In the experiment, the scope for moral hazard was not known to both parties in the Individual
treatment: although husbands knew about the existence of injectables, it was only in the Couple
treatment that they knew with certainty that the availability of injectables was guaranteed for
13Note that, in all cases, men being aware of the enhanced ability to access injectables actually increases moral
hazard, since injectables are practically undetectable.
10their wife. Under both a collective and a noncooperative model, because of a simple revealed
preference argument (the wife could choose to turn over the voucher to the husband or use it in
the Individual condition), and because the husband has decision rights over the use of the voucher
in the Couple group, we would predict that contraceptive use and welfare would be higher for
women in the Individual treatment than in the Couple treatment. Although we cannot test for
the long-run predictions of the framework without a diﬀerent experiment, we can use follow-up
data from our experiment to shed light on what mechanisms might be at play in the long run
by testing for psychosocial costs. Our framework predicts greater aggrievement arising from the
enhanced scope for moral hazard that increased supply creates among couples with misaligned
preference. In the long run, as injectables become widespread, a potential outcome (holding
preferences constant) is that the use of injectables would decline and fertility would either remain
the same or increase, depending on the extent of the aggrievement from husbands.14
4 Experimental Design and Data
This section describes the sample for the ﬁeld experiment, the survey data gathered, and how
we implemented the experimental conditions above and measured their impact.15
4.1 Sample
We recruited subjects from the catchment area of Chipata Clinic, a large government clinic that
serves low-income “compound” neighborhoods in Lusaka. Community health workers (CHWs)
from the clinic were hired to recruit subjects through home visits. Married women of childbear-
ing age (18-40) were invited to participate in the study if they: (1) currently lived with their
husband; (2) had last given birth between January 2004 and December 2006; (3) were not cur-
rently pregnant; (4) had neither been sterilized nor had a hysterectomy; (5) were not known to
have health conditions for which hormonal contraceptives are contraindicated; and (6) agreed to
participate in a survey and information session about family planning together with their hus-
14Of course, it is possible that as countries get richer, both male and female preferences for contraception and
fertility will change, which could lessen this eﬀect.
15This experiment is part of the larger Zambian Contraceptive Access Study (ZCAS). Ashraf et al. (2012) explore
the implications of lowering the price of contraception in the combined treatment group compared to a control
group that did not receive the voucher, while this paper focuses on the diﬀerence between the Individual and
Couple Treatment arms, which were randomized as a second stage of the study.
11band.16 Although the voucher intervention only required the husband’s presence in the Couple
condition, criteria (6) was imposed on all subjects in order to prevent higher rates of attrition
among those assigned to the Couple condition relative to those in the Individual condition. Re-
cruitment was conducted in two stages using two diﬀerent sampling frames during July 2006 to
April 2007, described in detail in the Online Appendix.
Figure 1 illustrates the stages of our experiment, with relevant sample sizes. The experiment
consisted of a baseline survey in the ﬁrst visit administered solely to the wife, during which an
appointment was made for a second visit with both the wife and husband. Treatment (Individual
versus Couple) was then randomly assigned.17 Among the 1031 women eligible for inclusion in
the experiment, 749 participated, including 371 assigned to the Couple treatment condition and
378 assigned to the Individual condition. Figure 1 shows the breakdown of reasons for non-
participation. Non-participation overwhelmingly reﬂected resource constraints on the part of the
investigators and a strict timeline for completion of the study, both of which caused us to halt
recruitment eﬀorts before all households could be reached for a second visit.
Given that recruitment was double-blind, drop-out happened before assignment was re-
vealed to either subjects or enumerators. Hence, it is safe to assume that factors determining
non-participation were orthogonal to treatment assignment.18 Correspondingly, rates of non-
participation were almost identical across treatment arms (28.4% in the Couple arm and 26.2%
in the Individual arm). Table 1, which reveals that treatment arms in the ﬁnal sample (ex-
cluding non-participants) remained balanced on all observables, provides further evidence that
non-participation was independent of treatment assignment.19
Approximately two years later, we conducted a follow-up survey in which we re-interviewed
94% of individuals, leaving a ﬁnal sample of 706. Only 1% of study subjects could not be
accounted for (an additional 3% had passed away and 2% refused).There were no signiﬁcant
diﬀerences in attrition rates at follow-up across treatment arms.
16Each of these inclusion criteria was screened by the CHW during recruitment visits. In addition, women were
thoroughly screened for health conditions for criteria 3 and 5 if and when they visited the family planning nurse
at Chipata clinic. Disqualifying health conditions included diabetes, heart disease and high blood pressure.
17Our choice to balance treatment assignment on baseline characteristics prevented us from randomizing earlier.
18Importantly, no subjects dropped out of the study mid-way through the second visit, which was when treatment
assignment was revealed.
19Although this non-participation is not a threat to internal validity, it could still aﬀect external validity: some
amount of non-participation may reﬂect subjects’ tacit unwillingness to participate in the study. However, the
direction of bias due to this type of sample selection is unclear. See Online Appendix Section on Sampling and
Online Appendix Table 2 for discussion.
124.2 Baseline Survey
Our baseline survey and voucher intervention for both treatment groups took place between
March and June 2007. At the ﬁrst household visit, a team of one enumerator and one CHW
administered the baseline survey to wives only (Figure 1). During this visit, CHWs ﬁrst re-
screened women to ensure that they continued to meet all of the inclusion criteria and still
agreed to participate. Eligible women gave consent to participate and were administered a one-
hour survey in their homes that collected detailed information about marriage and childbearing,
fertility preferences, decision-making in the household, and contraceptive use.
Immediately following the survey, CHWs were responsible for delivering health information
about the prevention of sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) and condom use and distributing
a three-pack of condoms.20 In addition, CHWs gave participants information about the beneﬁts
of family planning, the range of family planning methods available at Chipata Clinic, speciﬁc
information about injectable contraceptives and contraceptive implants including contraindica-
tions and side eﬀects, and counseling about dual protection. Husbands were not present during
either the survey or the information session of the ﬁrst visit.
4.3 Experiment
The key experimental manipulation took place during a second visit in which all households
received the voucher described above that guaranteed minimal wait time and access to injectables
and implants.21 Prior to this visit, all women were randomly assigned to either the Couple or
Individual condition, which determined whether they were given the voucher alone (Individual)
or together with their husband (Couple). Treatment group was assigned dynamically within
batches of surveys collected from enumerators approximately daily.22
The experimental protocol was as follows: when the ﬁeld team arrived at the couple’s home
20CHWs all had previous experience working with the clinic to implement information campaigns and homecare
programs. The script containing the information covered in this visit is provided in the Online Appendix
Section 3.
21Suﬃcient condoms, pills, and IUDs were already available at the clinic. To keep waiting lines short we spaced the
voucher intervention over 4 months, distributing about 50 vouchers per week. One injection lasted 3-4 months.
22Randomization was done using the minmax t statistic method (Bruhn and McKenzie, 2008), with treatment
assignment balanced on the following variables collected in the baseline survey: wife’s age, wife’s education,
current number of living children, reported desired number of children, reported diﬀerential in fertility desires
between the woman and her husband, whether the woman was currently using injectables, and whether the
woman was currently using the pill.
13for the second visit, the couple was told that the team would be conducting short surveys of each
spouse. To ensure conﬁdentiality, they were surveyed separately and in private. The husband’s
survey primarily gathered information on fertility preferences and income. The wife’s survey
contained only questions about whether she had visited a clinic since the previous visit and
whether she had seen or heard about the voucher.23
Treatment assignment was revealed to the survey team when they removed the survey instru-
ment from the pre-labeled envelope at the start of the interview. In both cases, ﬁrst the husband
was surveyed alone, then the voucher was given out, then the wife was surveyed alone. The
diﬀerence is that in the Couple condition, the husband and wife received the voucher together,
with the voucher given to the husband, whereas in the Individual condition, the wife was given
the voucher in private. In the Couple treatment, the husband’s NRC number was required on the
voucher and it was given directly to him. In the Individual treatment, the voucher was given to
her, it only required her NRC number on it, and she could simply take it and redeem it.24 Based
on responses to debrieﬁng surveys conducted among 48% of women in our study, we estimate
a 1.1% rate of non-compliance with treatment assignment. Throughout the paper we consider
only treatment assignment rather than treatment received.
Table 1 presents summary statistics on a wide range of variables available in the baseline
broken down by treatment assignment. Panel B describes summary statistics for the variables
that were used to balance assignment across the treatment arms, hence, means of these variables
are predictably very similar across these two groups. Out of 29 variables not used to balance the
sample there are no diﬀerences in means that are statistically signiﬁcant or large in magnitude,
indicating that treatment assignment was balanced.
4.4 Clinic Take-up Data
To keep track of visits women made to the family planning clinic to redeem their voucher,
the nurse hired for the study kept daily visit logs. To ensure that vouchers were not used by
individuals outside of our sample, the wife’s name and national ID numbers were written on
23The main purpose of re-surveying wives in this visit was to have women alone so that those assigned to the Indi-
vidual condition could be given the information session and voucher privately. Compensation for participation
was given to the husband and wife separately.
24The protocol is described in depth in the Online Appendix. CHWs and surveyors were responsible for ensuring
adherence to the protocol, monitored daily by supervisors.
14the voucher by enumerators, and women were instructed to bring their ID cards to the clinic
at the time of the visit for the nurse to verify.25 For each woman who came to the clinic to
redeem a voucher, the nurse veriﬁed her identity, discussed family planning alternatives, and
prescribed her desired method of contraception after screening for contraindications. Detailed
logs of each visit recorded the date and time of visit, the name and National Registration Code
(NRC) number of the woman, the ID number of the voucher, and the desired, prescribed and
received family planning method. Oﬃcial expiry date of the last voucher was June 23, 2007.
4.5 Follow-up Surveys
To study the impact on fertility of birth control access provided through our study, we conducted
a follow-up survey approximately two years after the baseline. The follow-up survey contained
detailed questions on reproductive histories over the past two years, as well as questions about
respondents’ marital status and current health and well-being.In addition, we collected extensive
qualitative data at the time of the follow-up survey, in focus groups with subsets of participants
(men and women separately) in July 2010, and in an additional round of individual interviews
in June 2012 about factors that inﬂuenced a respondent’s decision to redeem the voucher and,
for men, their interpretation of receiving the voucher.
5 Results
In the results that follow, we estimate a linear probability model with the following ordinary
least squares (OLS) regression:
Yi = a + IMH + !vXi + e (1)
where Yi is the binary outcome variable of interest; IMH is an indicator for assignment to the
Couple condition; and Xi is a vector of controls from the baseline survey, including: husband’s
and wife’s age, husband’s and wife’s education, husband’s and wife’s income, husband’s and
25These data were also cross-checked with two additional sources: 1) all of the vouchers that were redeemed were
physically collected from the clinic by the investigators to verify that all women who redeemed a voucher were
reported in the nurse’s logs; 2) enumerators conducted a short debrieﬁng survey with each woman in the study as
she exited the clinic after her family planning visit. We found no vouchers for women who completed debrieﬁng
surveys who were not recorded in the nurse’s log.
15wife’s existing and ideal number of children, whether wife was using contraception at baseline,
whether wife was over 40, whether wife was aware of her most fertile period of the month,
diﬀerence between the husband and wife’s total number of children, diﬀerence between husband
and wife’s preferences for number of children, months since last birth, and dummy indicators for
compound of residence within the catchment area. We show all results with and without a long
list of demographic controls detailed in the table notes. Tables 2-5 present experimental results
on the impact of assignment to the Couple treatment arm on voucher and injectable take-up,
and various indicators of female well-being.
We also reﬁne our empirical predictions to better ﬁt the conceptual framework motivating our
analysis by isolating the subsample of couples for whom we should expect the privacy condition
to inﬂuence contraceptive behavior. In particular, moral hazard only pertains to couples in which
incentives to have children are misaligned. That is, based on the conceptual model we expect
to see diﬀerences in outcomes only among couples that currently disagree over whether or how
quickly to have another child such that the man has a lower demand for birth spacing in the
immediate future. We classify such women as potential “responders” to Individual treatment
if they satisfy the following two criteria: (1) she does not want to get pregnant in the near
future,26 and (2) she believes that her husband desires more additional children than she does
at the time of the beginning of the study.27 While there is no reason to anticipate a response to
treatment among women who do not meet the criteria for potential responders, it is important
to note that there are many potential sources of measurement error in the variables used to
classify women as responders. These sources are likely to lead us to underestimate the number of
potential responders in the sample. For instance, women’s reported fertility desires may reﬂect
family planning objectives given the availability of contraceptives at baseline rather than under
the hypothetical “ideal” circumstances that they were asked about. Also, women may have
26A woman is considered to have unmet need for contraception if she: (1) is married or in a consensual union;
(2) is of reproductive age; (3) is capable of becoming pregnant; and (4) wants to have no more children or to
postpone childbearing by at least two years. Based on the sampling frame, all women in our study meet the
ﬁrst three criteria. We use two questions from the baseline survey data to identify women who meet the fourth
criteria at the time of the study: “If it were completely up to you, would you like to have another child within
the next two years, after two years or not at all?” and “If it were completely up to you, how long would you like
to wait until the birth of another child?” A respondent is reported as desiring to conceive if she reports wanting
to give birth within two years for either of these questions.
27Since we are interested in how the wife responds to gaining asymmetric control over guaranteed access to
contraceptives, we use her beliefs about her husband’s preferences rather than his stated preferences. We
include couples in which the man states a higher preference for either the ideal or maximum desired number of
children, so as to capture as many potential conﬂicts as possible.
16substantial uncertainty regarding their husband’s fertility preferences, and thus, for instance,
may conceal contraceptive use even when they guess that their husband does not want more
children if they assign some probability to his deciding to have another child.
5.1 Voucher and Contraceptive Use
5.1.1 Voucher Take-up
In total, 48% of women redeemed the voucher for family planning services. While 53% of women
in the Individuals treatment redeemed the voucher, the rate was only 43% in the Couple treat-
ment arm, a 19% reduction in use. Table 2 presents corresponding regression estimates of the
eﬀect of private information on voucher redemption, which verify that the diﬀerence is signiﬁcant
at the 5% level with and without controls (Column 1, Panels A and B).
Among the subset of potential responders, which encompasses a mere 23% of the sample,
women are 16 percentage points (25%) less likely to use the voucher in the Couple treatment
(signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level). Meanwhile, the point estimate is half the size and insigniﬁ-
cant among the predicted non-responders, although the diﬀerence between responders and non-
responders is not statistically signiﬁcant (Columns 5 and 7, Panels A and B).
To gain conﬁdence in our interpretation that this diﬀerence in voucher take-up is indeed due
to a diﬀerence in opportunity for hiding contraceptive use in the Individual treatment, we use
in-depth interviews conducted in conjunction with the follow-up survey to learn what women
did with the voucher after receiving it, including whether and why or why not they spoke to
their husbands about the voucher, why they did or did not use the voucher, and whether their
husbands discouraged them from using it.
Using these responses, we identify respondents in the Individual treatment who redeemed
the voucher without their husband’s knowledge because they believed he would otherwise not
have let them use it. That is, according to our analytical framework, the diﬀerence in the rate
of voucher redemption between the two treatment arms is equal to the number of Individually-
treated women who used the voucher but whose husbands would not have let them go had
they been made aware of the opportunity. We hand-coded each observation, making use of
all responses to questions in this section, and classify respondents’ motives conservatively such
that we only report a woman as hiding from her husband when she makes explicit reference to
17hiding.28
Identifying these respondents allows us to directly estimate the fraction of the treatment
eﬀect on voucher redemption that can be accounted for by greater reported ability to conceal.
In total, among women in the Individual condition who used the voucher, 11% admit that they
did so behind their husband’s back because he would not have let them redeem it, and an-
other 5% appear to have misrepresented the voucher oﬀer in order to convince their husbands
to let them use it. The ﬁrst category alone implies a 6 percentage point diﬀerence in voucher
redemption across treatment arms. If we also include cases of misrepresentation, this accounts
for an 8.5 percentage point diﬀerence in voucher use. These numbers imply that hiding vouchers
from disapproving husbands alone explains 60-85% of our estimated treatment eﬀect. Among
the responder subsample, women in the Individual treatment who admit in qualitative inter-
views to redeeming the voucher without their husband’s knowledge explain 61% of the estimated
treatment eﬀect.
5.1.2 Injectable Take-up
We next turn to the eﬀect of male involvement on take-up of injectable contraceptives.29 Given
that injectables are considered more concealable than other methods of contraception, husband
involvement should have an especially large negative eﬀect on their use. The estimates in Column
2 (Panels A and B) of Table 2 reveal that take-up of injectable contraceptives is 25% (6.0 percent-
age points) lower among women in the Couple condition and that the diﬀerence is statistically
signiﬁcant at the 5% level.30
These numbers imply that the rate of injectable take-up is disproportionately high among
voucher users, which we can infer from the fact that 46% of Individual voucher users received
injectables compared to only 43% of those in the Couple treatment. Using women in the Couple
treatment’s rate of take-up of injectables as the counterfactual, this implies that, among the
28For example, the following woman who was in the Individual treatment was coded as hiding: “I put [the voucher]
in the bag for my children’s clothes to hide it from my husband. I did not show him the voucher because he does
not know that I am using contraceptives.” In contrast, although ambiguous, the following Individually-treated
woman who used the voucher but did not tell her husband was not considered to be hiding. According to this
woman, “I kept the voucher in my handbag. I did not talk about the voucher with my husband.”
29Based on values recorded in the nurse’s logs, we construct an indicator variable equal to one if the woman
received injectable contraceptives at the time of her family planning visit.
30The results are robust to expanding the deﬁnition of relatively concealable methods to include contraceptive
implants and IUDs, both of which are used very rarely by women in our sample. Only 23 women chose to take
up implants through the voucher, compared to the 160 that took up injectables.
1819.1% of women who were encouraged by the privacy condition to redeem their voucher, the rate
of concealables is 59%.31
Among the responder subsample the diﬀerence is even starker: Women are 47.9% (13.6
percentage points) less likely to take up a concealable form of contraception when it is observable
to the husband, indicating that 85.3% of women who are encouraged to use family planning
services by the privacy condition demand injectables, compared to only 31.3% of responders
in the Couple condition (Table 2, Columns 5 and 6, Panels A and B). That is, virtually all
women in the responder subsample that use the voucher only when it is oﬀered in privacy go
home with injectables, or 2.7 times as many as would otherwise.32 With respect to take-up of
injectables, there is no diﬀerence according to treatment condition among women identiﬁed as
non-responders, and the diﬀerence in treatment eﬀect estimates between responders and non-
responders is statistically signiﬁcant.
5.1.3 Ineﬃcient Outcomes?
What is perhaps most interesting about fertility preferences among our potential responders is
that, while by deﬁnition they disagree on the ideal number of children, the majority agree that
they would not like to have a child in the near future. In particular, 63% of couples who disagree
about how many additional kids to have at baseline agree that it would be preferable to wait at
least two years to have their next child. This makes the experimental results somewhat puzzling
since it indicates that wives often have greater demand for long-acting contraception even when
their husbands would also prefer to avoid pregnancy. To investigate the patterns in more detail,
we run the experimental analysis on this subsample of “short-run concordant" couples. The sub-
sample, which encompasses 419 of the 749 households in our sample, is balanced on observable
characteristics across Couple and Individual arms, as shown in Online Appendix Table A.4. In
31In total, 18.3% of women in the Couple treatment received injectables. Since 42.8% of women in the Couple
treatment redeemed their vouchers, this is an average injectable take-up among voucher users of 42.8%. The rate
of 59% injectable usage among marginal voucher users comes from decomposing the average rate of injectable
take-up among the Individual voucher users (45.9%) into a weighted sum of the take-up rate among the 80.9%
of “unconditional” voucher users plus the 19.1% of “marginal” voucher users users implied by the diﬀerence in
rates of voucher use between treatment arms. In particular: 0:809(0:428) + 0:191(0:590) = 0:459
32Among this subsample, 14.8% of women in the Couple treatment received injectables. Since 47.3% of women
in the Couple treatment redeemed their vouchers, this is an average injectable take-up among voucher users of
31.3%. The rate of 85.3% injectable usage among marginal voucher users comes from decomposing the average
rate of injectable take-up among the Individual voucher users (44.9%) into a weighted sum of the take-up rate
among the 74.8% of “unconditional” voucher users plus the 25.2% of “marginal” voucher users implied by the
diﬀerence in rates of voucher use between treatment arms. In particular: 0:748(0:313) + 0:252(0:853) = 0:449
19terms of characteristics of couples that fall into this category, couples that agree on spacing in
the short-run look qualitatively similar to couples that do not, except that on average they have
more existing children, and are more likely to have recently given birth, suggesting that this
sub-sample reﬂects particular life stages of a couple rather than a diﬀerent type of couple.33
As predicted, the results of the subgroup analysis presented in Table 3 reveal that take-up of
family planning services and use of injectables are signiﬁcantly higher when women are assigned
to the Individual condition, even among couples for whom short-term fertility goals are aligned.
That is, even when neither partner wishes to have a child in the near future, men discourage
their wives from using injectables. Once again, the eﬀects are driven entirely by households in
which the husband desires more children than his wife (although he still prefers to space them,
by virtue of the fact that he claims to not want children within the next two years).34
Strikingly, among couples that agree in the short run but disagree in the long run, women are
twice as likely to redeem the voucher and three times as likely to choose long-acting hormonal
methods when they are assigned to the Individual treatment, despite the fact that neither spouse
wants to become pregnant. The magnitude of the estimate among this subset of responders
implies that most of the increase in contraceptive use occurs among households in which both
spouses wish to avoid pregnancy in the short run. As before, when spouses agree on the number
of children to bear, there is no eﬀect on take-up of hormonal methods (Table 3, Columns 5 and
6).
This suggests that discordance in spousal preferences over number of children discourages
men from using the most eﬀective form of contraceptive method even when they would ideally
rather postpone child-bearing, and thereby increases the rate of births that are unwanted (at
least in terms of timing) by both the husband and wife. However, the fact that couples do not
make use of injectables despite reporting that they would ideally like their next child not to be
born in the next two years can be rationalized in several ways, only some of which are consistent
with ineﬃcient outcomes in the household. We present four possible phenomena, the last three
33In particular, regressing an indicator of whether the couple agrees on delaying childbirth by at least two years on
a host of observable characteristics of the couple reveals that they diﬀer with respect to 4 characteristics: they
married at a younger age, have given birth more recently, are less sexually active, and have higher parity. Other
than the wife’s age at birth (which is only marginally signiﬁcant as a predictor of falling into this category), all
other characteristics are presumably indicators of the couple’s eagerness to have another child, which varies over
the life cycle of a couple.(results available on request).
34Note that this subset corresponds to a subset of our responder sample.
20being closely related to the problem of moral hazard surrounding the wife’s use of contraception,
this paper’s central theme.
First, because there is a stochastic component to conception and birth, attitudes towards risk
may play a role in explaining diﬀerences between husbands’ and wives’ desire to contracept even
when neither wants children right away. In particular, if the husband feels very strongly about
eventually attaining a suﬃciently high number of children, or attaining a child within a certain
time period (beyond 2 years), he may be willing to start trying to conceive now even though he
risks having a child very soon. In this case, although he reports that he would ideally like his
next child to be born in two years, he prefers to begin trying to conceive immediately to reduce
the risk of failing to produce suﬃciently many children over his lifetime.35 We present a simple
intra-household model with risk preferences over births in the Online Appendix to illustrate this.
Second, this diﬀerence may be exacerbated by inaccurate beliefs that husbands may hold
regarding the average necessary length of time for wives to conceive. Such diﬀerences in beliefs
can arise naturally in a world in which women utilize birth control covertly more often than
their husbands estimate. Indeed, in the post-experiment survey we ran among husbands we ﬁnd
that men overestimate the length of time to conception, compared to the average time it takes
for women of this age group to conceive naturally. In particular, on average men in our sample
report that they would only become suspicious that their wife was using contraception covertly
if she did not become pregnant after 26 months of sexual intercourse. Meanwhile, the estimated
time to conception for the average woman in her late twenties is signiﬁcantly shorter, even when
lactational amenorrhea from exclusive breastfeeding is taken into account.36 Husbands’ beliefs
about the hazard of conception may be systematically lower than their wives’ particularly among
couples in which women are more likely to have been hiding contraception in the past. If this is
the case, husbands’ perception of risk increases and they will on average desire a longer period
over which the couple attempts to conceive in an eﬀort to achieve their desired number of kids
relative to their wives who are better informed about actual time to conception.
Third, a husband who does not wish to conceive immediately, but does want more kids than
his wife does, may be unwilling to let his wife use contraception in that he may believe that
35The survey measure should thus be seen as eliciting the spouses’ preferences over spacing in a world in which
they could perfectly control birth events.
36See for instance, Wang et al. (2003) for an estimate from a population-based sample in China in which over 90% of
women in their mid-twenties conceive after 6 menstrual cycles of engaging in intercourse without contraceptives.
21doing so would exacerbate moral hazard in the future through, for instance, his wife learning
how to better hide or obtain injectables.37 The husband would thus be willing to have a child
in the near future, although reporting that ideally he would rather not, in order not to decrease
his bargaining strength, or speciﬁcally his ability to monitor her action, in the future.
Finally, moral hazard could also be relevant through a more elaborate channel. As we dis-
cussed above, the fact that the use of injectables is almost unobservable to the husband (coupled
with the fact that in this subsample husbands want more children than their wives) should lead
their wives to enjoy a larger share of the surplus created by the couple. Indeed, economic theory
tells us that, as long as bargaining does not collapse altogether, the party taking the unobservable
action may enjoy rents. However, we also know that the wife’s bargaining strength is decreas-
ing in her outside option (her payoﬀ outside the union), and in turn that the outside option is
decreasing in the number of children. If contracting is not perfectly eﬃcient, in that spouses
cannot commit fully to a future plan of actions and transfers, the husband may be tempted to
induce his wife into having children - even if he would ideally rather wait - as it would increase
his bargaining strength immediately (in the spirit of a hold-up problem).
5.2 Fertility
We next quantify the eﬀect of reducing the scope for moral hazard on fertility. Since husband
involvement lowered take-up of long-term contraceptive methods in the short run, but we do not
have reliable data on continuation rates (which were reportedly low), we concentrate on birth
rates 9-13 months after a respondent received a voucher. The largest diﬀerence in birth control
patterns between treatment arms is use of injectables, so this time period reﬂects the period over
which most women were protected by the birth control received from the treatment. As long
as there was little substitution towards contraceptives outside of the clinic, the diﬀerence in the
likelihood of giving birth 9 to 13 months after receiving a voucher measures the increased eﬃcacy
of concealable methods relative to birth control methods marginal users would otherwise have
relied on.
37We ﬁnd some evidence of this in qualitative follow up surveys we did with a convenience sample of 60 husbands,
in November 2102, which suggest that husbands worry signiﬁcantly about what happens at the Clinics and with
respect to contraceptive use. Men share among themselves what they believe are the most common side eﬀects
of particularly concealable contraceptives, but there is also concern that women learn how to hide these side
eﬀects and that women are learning more quickly than men based on women’s private interaction with the nurse
and family planning clinic.
22In total, 29% of women gave birth in the two years following our experiment, and 6.8% of
women gave birth 9-13 months after they received a voucher. If we deﬁne a birth as unwanted
if at baseline a woman stated that she did not want to have another child for at least two years
(consistent with the standard deﬁnition of unmet need for contraception), a remarkable 65% of
births in this interval were unwanted.38
Fertility patterns over the entire 24 months following the intervention are presented in Figure
2. Here we see a divergence in birth rates between the two treatment arms beginning at month
8 (the ﬁrst possible month that births could be inﬂuenced by the treatment), that lasts for
about 5 months. Between months 14 and 18, the pattern switches, and births in the Couple
treatment arm are signiﬁcantly lower. This pattern indicates that our intervention essentially
postponed births in the Individual arm by 3-5 months (or on average slightly more than the
duration of one shot of injectable contraceptives). Even this small degree of postponement oﬀers
a potentially signiﬁcant welfare beneﬁt for some women and children in a setting in which the
average pregnancy interval is 26 months and an estimated 20% of birth intervals are under
15 months. In terms of child health, a number of studies document that neonatal and infant
mortality as well as chronic and general undernutrition are decreasing functions of birth interval
until 36 months (Rutstein, 2005; Conde-Agudelo et al., 2006).
We next use treatment assignment as an instrument for voucher redemption, and estimate the
causal eﬀect of access to contraception provided through our study on births in the subsequent
year (9-13 months after the voucher was initially made available). The IV is valid as long as
receiving the Couple as opposed to the Individual treatment had no inﬂuence on fertility other
than through its eﬀect on use of family planning services provided through our study, which we
think is reasonable.39 Coeﬃcient and standard error estimates from the ﬁrst and second equation
of this bivariate probit estimation are presented in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.40 The total vector
38While this is higher than the DHS estimate (52%) of excess fertility in Zambia, the discrepancy is consistent
with the fact that, due to ex-post rationalization, ex-post measures of birth “wantedness” are generally much
higher than ex-ante measures.
39The two relevant proximate determinants of fertility to consider in assessing this are frequency of intercourse
and use of contraception. Arguably, the only scope for Individual treatment to increase use of birth control is
through changes in access provided through the voucher. Meanwhile, there is no reason to anticipate frequency
of intercourse to increase among couples unless failure to get pregnant reduces frequency of intercourse, which
is unlikely to be the case.
40Because a linear IV model provides a biased, while consistent, estimate of the average eﬀect of treatment and
its small sample performance may be inferior to a correctly speciﬁed maximum likelihood model, we use the
simplest approach of a maximum-likelihood bivariate probit or biprobit (Heckman, 1978).
23of control variables described above was included in the IV estimation. Using this estimation
to generate predicted values of births based on using the voucher, we calculate the Average
Treatment Eﬀect (ATE) and the Average Treatment Eﬀect on the Treated (ATT).41 Family
planning services oﬀered through our study have an average treatment eﬀect of -0.268, reducing
the likelihood of births in the next year by 27%. The ATE with controls (Table 2, Columns 3 and
4, Panel B) is -0.325. The coeﬃcients for the bivariate probit model are statistically signiﬁcant
at the 5% level in both stages, which indicates that the estimated ATE is statistically signiﬁcant
(Greene, 2010). The ATT estimates are nearly twice as large (between -0.47 and -0.58).
The fact that birth rates are substantially diﬀerent between treatment groups also conﬁrms
that substitution among the Couple group towards other, equally eﬀective sources of birth control
oﬀered outside of the clinic was limited. Hence, the short-term fertility results validate our
previous ﬁndings on take-up of contraception since they measure the eﬀect of contraceptives
obtained from all possible sources.
5.3 Well-Being
Using data from the follow-up survey two years after the experiment, we look at the eﬀects of
assignment to the Couple treatment on separation, domestic violence, condom use and subjective
well-being (Table 4 and Table 5). Recall that the model of aggreivement predicts that such
indicators of marital strife could increase, particularly in the long run when husbands become
aware of the scope for concealment. We ﬁnd little evidence that these outcomes are aﬀected by
treatment assignment: in the sample of all women, point estimates on an indicator for assignment
to the Couple arm are small and statistically insigniﬁcant in all speciﬁcations (Columns 1, 2 and
3). The same is true for the subsample of potential respondents.
For predicted non-responders, we ﬁnd that assignment to the Couple arm is associated with
a signiﬁcant decrease in rates of condom use relative to the Individual arm (Column 9), although
the estimate loses signiﬁcance when controls are added. One interpretation is that, when men feel
less suspicious that wives are using family planning, they are less concerned about extra-marital
aﬀairs. However, it is unclear why this result would only show up for couples in which there is
no current disagreement over fertility.
41Using Stata’s binormal command to calculate predicted linear indices provides the same estimates.
24We also asked women directly several questions about their subjective well-being.42 We use
three main subjective well-being measures to evaluate life satisfaction, happiness and peace of
mind, and health, described in detail in Table 5. Using the same categorization of responders
as described above, we ﬁnd that those women in the Couple treatment report being signiﬁcantly
happier and healthier than those in the Individual treatment group. Speciﬁcally, 50% of potential
responders in the Individual treatment report their overall health as being “good” or “excellent”
compared to women in their community of the same age, while 73% of potential responders in the
Couple treatment group report this high level of health, a diﬀerence that is signiﬁcant at the 1%
level. 69% of women who are predicted responders in the Couple treatment group report feeling
“Happy and Content” or “Very Happy and Content” compared to women in their community of
the same age, compared to 54% of potential responders in the Individual treatment group, a
diﬀerence that is marginally signiﬁcant with a p-value of 0.057. We see no signiﬁcant diﬀerences
in these outcomes associated with assignment to the Couple or Individual treatment, however,
in the full sample of women in our study.
6 Discussion
Our ﬁndings that in the Couple treatment there was signiﬁcantly less take-up of the voucher,
less take-up of injectables, and subsequently more births (less spacing) than in the Individual
treatment, are consistent with the predictions for the experiment in both the collective and
noncooperative models we describe. Although these results demonstrate that women in couples
with misaligned preferences are willing to hide when given the opportunity, this is not necessarily
evidence of ineﬃciency, given that husbands were not aware of the change in scope for moral
hazard. However, even when both spouses do not want to have children in the next two years
but do have misaligned preferences over number of children, the fact that the privacy condition
increases take-up of the cheaper contraceptive option suggests that couples may have diﬃculty
coming to an eﬃcient bargaining outcome.43
An important limit to extrapolating from our results is that injectables were freely available
42Subjective well-being measures of self-reported happiness and satisfaction in life have been shown to be signiﬁ-
cantly correlated with physical measures of happiness in the body and brain (Diener, 1984), as well as evaluations
by friends, sleep quality and changes in life circumstances (Diener et al., 2006; Kahneman and Krueger, 2006).
43As we mention in the Conceptual Framework, this could be suggestive of dynamic ineﬃciency, even if there is
static eﬃciency.
25to women in our study, which is not the case in much of Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in rural
areas. Furthermore, our asymmetry of decision rights over contraceptive access was accompanied
by informational asymmetries within couples regarding the ease of accessing concealable contra-
ceptives. Although our experiment does not allow us to evaluate what would happen when both
parties are fully aware of the scope of moral hazard, our follow-up survey results provide some
evidence that rising tension and strife within the marriage is likely to undo at least some of the
short-run eﬀects we ﬁnd. That is, while we do not ﬁnd evidence of increased separation, divorce
or violence, as described in the Conceptual Framework, breakdown of cooperative bargaining
may well take the form of staying together but with less happiness. Our results on subjective
well-being point in that direction. Extensive qualitative work we conducted with subjects after
the study reaﬃrm that the channel could well be one of more (or less, in the case of the Cou-
ple treatment) mistrust and sense of exclusion. Of course, as we point out above, this is only
one possible way of incorporating this implication of moral hazard in intimate settings into a
framework of decision-making over fertility, and depends critically on maintaining the diﬀerence
in fertility demand between husbands and wives.
7 Conclusions
This paper uses a novel experimental design to understand the nature of household bargaining
over fertility in a world of hormonal contraceptive technology that is only perfectly observable to
the wife. Our experimental manipulation changed the degree of concealability of contraceptive
use by varying whether a woman received access to injectable contraception alone or in the
presence of her spouse. The opportunity to conceal led to a dramatic increase in use of injectables
and reduction in births. Furthermore, the pattern of results indicates that giving women greater
opportunity to conceal birth control brought not only women but also a non-trivial fraction of
men closer to their short-term fertility goals by increasing the rate of eﬀective contraception
among couples who both wished to avoid pregnancy in the near future but who diﬀered in terms
of long-run fertility goals.
In this manner, the paper documents the role of moral hazard in household decision-making
over fertility, and presents evidence of ineﬃciencies in household bargaining around fertility
that have not been considered in the existing literature. Our ﬁndings also provide suggestive
26evidence of a trade-oﬀ between privately improving a woman’s set of choices, which may result
in contraceptive use outcomes that could improve welfare for herself and her child, and lowering
the conjugal value of the marriage. In particular, survey data on subjective well-being collected
more than two years after the experiment indicate lower health and happiness among woman
given the opportunity to conceal relative to those whose husbands were given some degree of
veto power over injectables. This result points in the direction of longer-run implications of
the conceptual framework we present, whereby husbands feel aggrieved as the scope for moral
hazard increases in the home and the subsequent shading and mistrust can lead, under certain
conditions, to lower welfare for all.
The ﬁnding of a potential negative eﬀect of male involvement among couples with conﬂicting
fertility preferences helps explain why results from previous studies on male involvement in family
planning have been mixed, and why concealable contraceptives such as injectables have proven
to be so popular in cultural contexts in which men dominate family planning decisions.44 In
reality, the path of giving women access to injectables privately, while improving their set of
choices, also may have detrimental consequences for the conjugal value of their marriage. Hence,
it is important for practitioners to ask whether policies that further reduce the marriage surplus
for women are the best option, even if they improve certain individual outcomes.
Given that household frictions may result from the interaction of misaligned preferences with
unobservable contraceptive choice, changing either of these features could improve the bargaining
environment. Understanding why male and female preferences are so misaligned, and involving
men in a way that inﬂuences their preferences on number of children or helps them to better
internalize the costs to women of childbearing and child-raising may be promising areas for future
research and policy development.
44Over the past 40 years, only three randomized studies – Fisek and Sumbuloglu (1978), Terefe and Larson (1983),
and Wang et al. (1998) – have found any evidence that providing education about family planning to husbands
raised adoption of contraception, and one very large study Freedman and Takeshira (1969) found no eﬀect.
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Individual Treatment Couple Treatment
Mean SE N Mean SE N P-Value
Panel A
Highest schooling attained 6.673 0.225 339 6.487 0.159 339 0.409
Husband’s highest schooling attained (reported by wife) 9.536 0.205 343 9.377 0.145 337 0.436
Ideal number of children 3.915 0.115 378 3.997 0.0817 371 0.476
Age 27.58 0.456 378 27.65 0.324 368 0.873
Husband’s age (reported by wife) 34.50 0.547 339 34.46 0.390 327 0.938
Husband’s ideal number of children (reported by wife) 4.184 0.142 359 4.286 0.101 346 0.471
Has ever used a modern contraceptive method 0.889 0.0237 378 0.873 0.0168 371 0.511
Wife has monthly income 0.347 0.0353 378 0.396 0.0251 371 0.160
Wife knows when she is most fertile 0.142 0.0251 346 0.103 0.0178 339 0.126
Wife wants to become pregnant in following 2 years 0.262 0.0324 378 0.275 0.0230 371 0.688
Age wife married 19.39 0.304 373 19.03 0.216 366 0.238
Catholic 0.217 0.0304 378 0.226 0.0216 371 0.755
Comparison of happiness with other women in region
(1=very unhappy, 5=very happy) 3.579 0.0654 378 3.563 0.0464 371 0.806
Comparison of health with other women in region
(1=very poor, 5=excellent) 3.619 0.0562 378 3.657 0.0400 370 0.502
Number of years respondent lived in Lusaka 18.33 0.788 378 17.88 0.561 369 0.562
Couple has electricity 0.410 0.0359 378 0.391 0.0255 371 0.592
Formally married 0.886 0.0236 378 0.879 0.0167 371 0.749
Number of days in past 7 days couple has sex 2.067 0.121 373 2.068 0.0858 369 0.995
Number of days in past month couple has sex 7.920 0.395 374 8.180 0.280 367 0.510
Number of children husband has with other women 0.289 0.0335 367 0.283 0.0237 364 0.861
Frequency at which couple has talked about contraception in last
year 1.775 0.0768 378 1.701 0.0546 371 0.334
Couple has ever disagreed on number of children 0.138 0.0248 378 0.127 0.0176 371 0.661
Couple has ever disagreed on contraception use 0.106 0.0230 378 0.116 0.0163 371 0.661
Have used contraceptive method without husband’s knowledge 0.138 0.0253 377 0.138 0.0179 370 0.997
Husband drinks at least 2 to 3 times a week 0.410 0.0360 378 0.418 0.0256 371 0.830
Husband has ever threatened physical violence 0.516 0.0364 378 0.566 0.0259 371 0.169
Wife ever pressured to have sex 0.500 0.0366 378 0.518 0.0260 371 0.632
Husband does budgeting 0.143 0.0261 378 0.157 0.0186 370 0.595
Husband decides major purchases 0.655 0.0349 377 0.647 0.0248 371 0.813
Joint F Statistic 12.86
P-value 0.996
Panel B
Using any method at baseline 0.841 0.0259 377 0.869 0.0184 366 0.280
Number of living children 2.950 0.132 377 2.986 0.0941 366 0.781
Using injectable at baseline 0.202 0.0300 377 0.221 0.0214 366 0.511
Using pill at baseline 0.297 0.0337 377 0.306 0.0240 366 0.791
Using a hormonal contraceptive at baseline 0.501 0.0367 377 0.536 0.0261 366 0.352
Has ever used an injectable contraceptive method 0.405 0.0359 378 0.407 0.0255 371 0.950
Months sine last birth (at recruitment) 15.57 0.445 377 15.30 0.317 366 0.536
Husband’s age (reported by husband) 33.80 0.563 376 34.24 0.400 371 0.438
Husband’s highest schooling attained (reported by husband) 8.831 0.213 378 8.682 0.151 371 0.485
Husband’s ideal number of children (reported by husband) 4.168 0.148 374 4.435 0.105 368 0.0721
Husband’s average monthly income (1,000 USD) (reported by husband) 0.131 0.0160 378 0.153 0.0114 371 0.162
Wife earned money in previous month 0.403 0.0363 375 0.450 0.0257 369 0.194
Husband works 40+ hours 0.575 0.0374 360 0.546 0.0267 346 0.442
Wife ever pressured violently to have sex 0.128 0.0253 375 0.149 0.0180 370 0.415
Husband decides savings 0.614 0.0356 378 0.622 0.0254 368 0.811
Husband holds the money 0.164 0.0275 372 0.171 0.0195 368 0.793T
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.Table 4: Eﬀect of Private Information Treatment on Households - Potential Adverse Eﬀects of Intervention
Panel A: Without Controls
All Women Responders Non-Responder
Separated Domestic Using Separated Domestic Using Separated Domestic Using
Violence Condom Violence Condom Violence Condom
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Assigned to
Couple
Treatment -0.028 0.001 -0.034 -0.050 0.012 0.067 -0.016 -0.010 -0.054**
(0.018) (0.033) (0.023) (0.038) (0.073) (0.051) (0.021) (0.039) (0.027)
Panel B: With Controls
Assigned to
Couple
Treatment -0.028 0.016 -0.024 -0.048 0.018 0.074 -0.021 -0.006 -0.039
(0.019) (0.034) (0.024) (0.042) (0.075) (0.055) (0.022) (0.040) (0.028)
N 706 704 705 156 154 155 509 509 509
Mean of Outcome Variable
among Individual Treatment 0.076 0.268 0.122 0.080 0.267 0.080 0.069 0.268 0.134
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
[1] A responder is deﬁned as a women who doesn’t want a child in the next two years who believes her husband wants to have more children than
they currently have and who also believes her husband wants more children than she does. Non-responders didn’t satisfy these requirements and
didn’t have missing information on the relevant variables.
[2] Controls are same as Table 3.
[3] Domestic violence at follow-up is measured using the following question: Has your husband ever been physically violent toward you?
Table 5: Eﬀect of Private Information Treatment on Households - Measures of Well Being
Panel A: Without Controls
All Women Responders Non-Responder
Satisfaction Health Happiness Satisfaction Health Happiness Satisfaction Health Happiness
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Assigned to
Couple
Treatment 0.041 0.038 0.049 0.053 0.230∗∗ 0.151* 0.070 0.008 0.050
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.078) (0.077) (0.079) (0.044) (0.044) (0.043)
Panel B: With Controls
Assigned to
Couple
Treatment 0.030 0.028 0.048 0.065 0.273*** 0.142* 0.059 -0.028 0.053
(0.036) (0.038) (0.037) (0.078) (0.085) (0.083) (0.044) (0.045) (0.044)
N 705 705 705 155 155 155 509 509 509
Mean of Outcome Variable
among Individual Treatment 0.588 0.568 0.574 0.609 0.506 0.540 0.557 0.589 0.573
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
[1] A responder is deﬁned as a women who doesn’t want a child in the next two years who believes her husband wants to have more children than
they currently have and who also believes her husband wants more children than she does. Non-responders didn’t satisfy these requirements and
didn’t have missing information on the relevant variables.
[2] Controls are same as Table 3.
[3] Satisfaction is measured using the following question: All things considered, how satisﬁed are you with your life as a whole these days?
Please tell me which number on this scale more adequately represents your level of satisfaction with your life as a whole: 1 means you are ?
"Completely Dissatisﬁed" and 5 means you are "Completely Satisﬁed".
[4] Health is measured using the following question: Compared to women in your community of the same age, how would you describe your overall health?
[5] Happiness is measured using the following question: Compared to women in your community of the same age, how would you describe your overall
level of happiness and peace of mind? "Very Unhappy or Discontent" is coded as 1 and "Very Happy and Content" is coded as 5.
[6] An individual was considered satisﬁed, healthy or happy if they responded with a value great than or equal to 4 for the above questions.